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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Indivior, Inc., formerly Reckitt Benckiser 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Reckitt”), manufactured Suboxone, a 
prescription drug used to treat opioid addiction.  Direct 
purchasers of Suboxone (“Purchasers”) allege that Reckitt 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct that impeded the entry of 
generic versions of the drug into the market in violation of § 2 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.  In a thorough, thoughtful, 
and well-reasoned opinion, the District Court certified a class 
of those who purchased Suboxone from Reckitt, and Reckitt 






 We first explain how prescription drugs enter the 
market.  A company wishing to offer a new drug for sale must 
seek approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) by filing a New Drug Application (“NDA”).  Mylan 
Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 
427 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355).  Once the drug is 
approved for sale, it is considered a “brand” or “brand-name” 
drug.  Id.  To increase competition and reduce prices, Congress 
enacted a streamlined method for generic manufacturers to 
introduce drugs by allowing them to “piggy-back” on the brand 
drug’s “approval efforts.”  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 
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142 (2013).  Specifically, a generic drug maker may submit an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that may “rely 
on a name-brand drug company’s original NDA approval for a 
particular drug in order to gain quicker, less costly FDA 
approval of a generic version.”  Mylan, 838 F.3d at 427.   
 
If a generic drug manufacturer demonstrates that “the 
proposed generic product is both a ‘bioequivalent’ and a 
‘pharmaceutical’ equivalent of the name-brand drug,” then it 
may “have [its] product deemed ‘AB-rated’ to the name-brand 
drug by the FDA.”  Id. at 427-28.1  State laws either allow or 
require pharmacists to substitute these AB-rated, lower-cost 
generic drugs for a name-brand version.  Id. at 428.  Due to 
such substitution laws and the generic drugs’ low cost, generics 
often significantly erode a brand drug’s market share.  See In 
re: Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) 
Antitrust Litig. (Motion to Dismiss), 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 673 




 Reckitt developed Suboxone tablets.  The FDA granted 
Reckitt a seven-year period of exclusivity in which other 
manufacturers could not introduce generic versions of 
Suboxone tablets.  As the exclusivity period neared its end for 
its brand drug, Reckitt developed an under-the-tongue film 
 
1 An “AB-rating” denotes that the generic is 
“bioequivalent” and “pharmaceutically equivalent to the brand 
drug, meaning it has the same active ingredient, dosage form, 
strength, and route of administration as the brand drug.”  New 
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 645 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
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version of Suboxone, which would enjoy its own exclusivity 
period.  Generic versions of Suboxone tablets would not be 
AB-rated to Suboxone film, so state substitution laws would 
not require pharmacists to substitute generic Suboxone tablets 
if a patient were prescribed Suboxone film.  
    
 According to the Purchasers, Reckitt’s transition to 
Suboxone film was coupled with efforts to eliminate demand 
for Suboxone tablets and to coerce prescribers to prefer film.  
To that end, Reckitt allegedly: (1) engaged in a widespread 
campaign falsely disparaging Suboxone tablets as more 
dangerous to children and more prone to abuse; (2) publicly 
announced that it would withdraw Suboxone tablets from the 
market due to these safety concerns; (3) ended its Suboxone 
tablet rebate contracts with managed care organizations in 
favor of Suboxone film rebate contracts; (4) increased tablet 
prices above film prices; (5) withdrew brand Suboxone tablets 
from the market; and (6) impeded and delayed the market entry 
of generic Suboxone tablets by manipulating the FDA’s Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (“REMS”) process2 and 
 
2 The FDA can require REMS from manufacturers to 
ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh its risks.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 355-1(a)(1).  A REMS can include elements such as 
medication guides, package inserts, and communication plans 
for healthcare providers.  § 355-1(e).  If the FDA requires a 
REMS for a generic product, the FDA can require that the 
ANDA sponsor coordinate with the brand-name to create a 
Single Shared REMS program.  § 355-1(i).  However, brand-
name manufacturers cannot use REMS “to block or delay 
approval of” ANDAs.  § 355-1(f)(8). 
7 
 
filing a baseless citizen petition.3  Through these actions, 
Reckitt shifted the market to Suboxone film by the time generic 
Suboxone tablets hit the market and continued to dominate the 
Suboxone market as the exclusive maker of Suboxone film.   
 
 The Purchasers sued Reckitt,4 alleging that its efforts to 
suppress generic competition amounted to unlawful 
maintenance of monopoly power, in violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  The Purchasers moved to certify a class of “[a]ll 
persons or entities . . . who purchased branded Suboxone 
tablets directly from Reckitt” during a specified period.  App. 
5-6.  The proposed class representatives were Burlington Drug 
Company, Inc. and two other purchasers.  Burlington’s 
corporate designee testified that although Burlington was not 
“control[ling]” class counsel, Burlington is aware it is a 
“fiduciary” for the class, understands the injury claimed, and 
has been kept apprised of activities in the case.  App. 186.  In 
addition, Burlington has produced thousands of pages of 
electronic transaction level data reflecting purchases, charge 
backs, and sales of Suboxone tablets, as well as documents 
from the electronic files of ten employees.    
 
In support of class certification, the Purchasers 
submitted an expert report by Dr. Russell Lamb, an economist.  
Dr. Lamb concluded that, due to Reckitt’s allegedly 
 
3 Persons or entities can raise concerns to the FDA 
regarding drug approvals through a citizen petition, and “[t]he 
filing of a citizen petition can substantially delay approval of a 
generic drug.”  FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 
152 (3d Cir. 2019).  Congress has passed restrictions on using 
citizen petitions to delay drug approvals.  Id. at 152 n.7. 
4 This appeal concerns only the Purchasers. 
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anticompetitive conduct, the proposed class paid more for 
brand Suboxone products.5  Dr. Lamb attributed these 
overcharges to Reckitt’s actions that: (1) suppressed generic 
tablet competition, so the Purchasers had to buy brand tablets 
or film instead of less expensive generic tablets; (2) delayed 
market entry of generic tablets, increasing the time more 
expensive brand tablets could dominate the market; and 
(3) increased the price of brand tablets.  To reach these 
conclusions, Dr. Lamb relied on internal Reckitt documents 
reflecting its national Suboxone strategy and economic 
analysis of tablet pricing.  Dr. Lamb also calculated the 
damages attributable to this injury.  Using economic modeling 
and data from Reckitt, he estimated, in the aggregate, the 
difference between the actual prices charged for brand 
Suboxone tablets and film and the price class members would 
have paid for generic and non-Reckitt-brand versions.   
 
The District Court certified the class.  In re: Suboxone 
(Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig. 
(Class Certification), 421 F. Supp. 3d 12, 26 (E.D. Pa. 2019).  
As relevant to this appeal, the Court held that (1) common 
evidence of injury and damages showed that the Purchasers 
paid more for brand Suboxone products than they would have 
 
5  As the Purchasers clarified at oral argument, the class 
consists of direct purchasers of name-brand Suboxone tablets, 
but the alleged injuries are for paying more for name-brand 
tablets and, for certain members who also purchased film, 
paying more for film as a result of Reckitt’s alleged 
anticompetitive conduct.  Therefore, the damages the 
Purchasers seek are overcharges for name-brand tablets, and 
paying more for name-brand tablets and film than they would 
have for generic tablets.   
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for generic tablets due to Reckitt’s actions to promote film, 
disparage tablets, and suppress generics’ market entry, id. at 
62-63; (2) although the Purchasers’ aggregate damages model 
did not allocate damages among class members, “[i]ssues 
regarding allocation of individual damages [were] insufficient 
to defeat class certification,” id. at 64; and (3) Burlington was 
an adequate class representative because it had the requisite 
knowledge of the litigation, including “the basis for the 
claimed injury,” and its interests aligned with the class, id. at 




 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth the 
requirements for class certification.  Gonzalez v. Corning, 885 
F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2018).  As relevant here, Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires that common questions predominate and Rule 23(a)(4) 
requires that the named plaintiffs adequately represent the 





6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1337(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(f).     
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Grandalski 
v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2014) 





 Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
“To assess predominance, a court . . . must examine each 
element of a legal claim through the prism of Rule 23(b)(3)” 
by determining whether each element is “capable of proof at 
trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than 
individual to its members.”  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 
687 F.3d 583, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  The Purchasers’ claims require them to 
prove (1) “a violation of the antitrust laws” (here, unlawful 
monopolization by Reckitt);7 (2) “individual injury resulting 
from that violation”; and (3) “measurable damages.”  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 




Reckitt first argues that the Purchasers have not 
provided common evidence of injury or damages8 that matches 
 
7 Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States.”  15 U.S.C. § 2. 
8 “Proof of injury (whether or not an injury occurred at 
all) must be distinguished from calculation of damages (which 
determines the actual value of the injury).”  In re Lamictal 
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 957 F.3d 184, 194-95 (3d Cir. 
2020) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended 
(Oct. 16, 2001)). 
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a viable theory of liability, as required by Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2013) (holding that class 
certification was inappropriate when a damages model 
reflected injury from four antitrust injuries, but only one viable 
theory of antitrust liability and injury remained in the case).  
Reckitt does not dispute that the Purchasers have provided 
common evidence showing that the class paid more for 
Suboxone products.  Reckitt, however, argues that it could 
lawfully raise the prices on Suboxone tablets and change its 
rebate program,9 so the Purchasers do not have an antitrust 
injury.     
 
The Purchasers’ theory of their case, however, “is not 
[simply] that Reckitt’s pricing of brand tablets individually 
caused harm.”  Class Certification, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 62.  
Rather, they allege that the totality of Reckitt’s actions, such as 
raising prices, withdrawing tablets from the market, providing 
rebates only for film, disparaging the safety of tablets, and 
delaying the generics’ entry by filing a citizen petition and not 
cooperating in the REMS process, suppressed generic 
competition and thus violated the antitrust laws.  They contend 
that such conduct resulted in the following antitrust injury:  
having to pay more for brand Suboxone products when less-
expensive generic tablets should have been available but were 
not because of Reckitt’s actions.10  Reckitt incorrectly asks us 
 
9 Reckitt acknowledges, however, that nonpricing 
conduct, such as the allegations that Reckitt falsely disparaged 
the tablets’ safety, if proven, would be unlawful and subject to 
common evidence.   
10 Reckitt’s price-cost argument is inapt.  This case is 
not one involving a pricing scheme alone.  Rather, this case 
includes a scheme to suppress generic competition through a 
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to examine each of these acts individually.  Rather, we look at 
“all the acts taken together [to determine whether they] show 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly.”  
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 
813 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Phila. Taxi Ass’n, Inc. v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 339 (3d Cir.) (explaining that we 
“look to the monopolist’s conduct taken as a whole rather than 
considering each aspect in isolation” (citation omitted)), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 211 (2018).  The common evidence here 
would be used to prove that these actions occurred and together 
suppressed generic competition, and thereby caused the 
Purchasers to buy the higher-priced brand Suboxone products 
because Reckitt’s actions made it difficult for the less 
expensive generics to compete.11  Thus, common evidence 
 
series of actions that will be proven by common evidence.  
Higher tablet pricing and the cancellation of tablet rebates were 
just two acts used to keep generic tablets out of the market, and 
which led the Purchasers to pay for higher priced Suboxone 
tablets when, in a competitive market, they would have been 
able to purchase less expensive generic tablets.  When 
reviewing similar allegations, we have held that common 
evidence that class members paid higher prices than they 
otherwise would have easily satisfies the predominance 
standard.  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 
528 (3d Cir. 2004).   
11 Reckitt relies mainly on Comcast, 569 U.S. 27, to 
argue that the Purchasers’ theory of injury for which they have 
common evidence does not match any viable theory of 
liability, so certification is wrong.  Comcast is distinguishable.  
In Comcast, plaintiffs alleged four theories of antitrust injury, 
but the district court certified a class based on one theory.  569 
U.S. at 31.  The damages model plaintiffs used estimated 
13 
 





 Next, Reckitt argues that the Purchasers did not satisfy 
the predominance requirement because their damages model 
only calculates aggregate damages, and the eventual need for 
 
damages based on the combined effects of all four theories; but 
the district court held that certification was still proper.  Id. at 
31-32.  The Supreme Court held that class certification was 
wrong because “the model failed to measure damages resulting 
from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ 
liability in this action is premised.”  Id. at 36.  That is, the 
model “identifie[d] damages that are not the result of the 
wrong” suffered by the certified class.  Id. at 37.      
This case is unlike Comcast because there is only one 
theory of antitrust injury, and that theory corresponds to a 
theory of liability.  To make Comcast seem applicable, Reckitt 
construes the Purchasers’ claim as one alleging that Reckitt 
unlawfully raised prices (the liability theory, which Reckitt 
argues is not viable), and the Purchasers paid higher prices as 
a result (the injury theory).  Raising prices, however, was just 
one aspect of Reckitt’s alleged monopolistic conduct, which is 
better described as a multifaceted yet single scheme to move 
the market to Suboxone film to stifle competition from generic 
tablets.  As a result, the Purchasers could not purchase less-
expensive generic tablets.  Thus, while Reckitt would argue 
that each of the six allegedly anticompetitive actions represents 
a different theory of liability, in fact there is one theory of 
liability proven by a variety of acts resulting in one antitrust 
injury.    
14 
 
individualized damages inquiries defeats predominance.  
Reckitt is incorrect.  Antitrust plaintiffs may satisfy the 
predominance requirement by using a model that estimates the 
damages attributable to the antitrust injury, even if more 
individualized determinations are needed later to allocate 
damages among class members.  In re Modafinil Antitrust 
Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 262 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 29, 
2016).12  For example, in Modafinil, a brand-name 
manufacturer entered into agreements with four manufacturers 
to hold off marketing generic versions of the drug, id. at 245, 
and direct-purchaser plaintiffs “created a damages model that 
calculated the savings to the class if generic entry had occurred 
earlier,” id. at 262.  The defendants argued that this model was 
insufficient because it did not “attribute a certain amount of 
harm” from each agreement or “identify which class members 
were harmed by which [agreement].”  Id.  We rejected the need 
to show each class member suffered identical damages because 
“Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is not that each individual 
agreement caused an individual harm,” but instead “that each 
individual agreement contributed to the market-wide 
harm” and this “match[ed] Plaintiffs’ damages theory.”  Id. 
 
 
12 See also Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 
F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding use of aggregate 
damages model and explaining that “at the class certification 
stage, plaintiffs are not obliged to drill down and estimate each 
individual class member’s damages,” as “the allocation of that 
total sum among the class members can be managed 
individually”); Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 
F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Carriuolo v. Gen. 
Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 988 (11th Cir. 2016) (same). 
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 Like in Modafinil, the Purchasers’ model does not 
measure how Reckitt’s scheme harmed each class member and 
recognizes that there could be differences among the class 
members concerning the precise damages they suffered.  
Individualized determinations, however, are of no 
consequence in determining whether there are common 
questions concerning liability.  See id.; see also Tyson Foods, 
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (“[T]he 
action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even 
though other important matters will have to be tried separately, 
such as damages . . . .” (citation omitted)).  Rather, we need be 
assured only that common issues predominate.  See Tyson 
Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1045.  Such is the case here because the 
Purchasers’ theory of injury and damages is provable and 
measurable by an aggregate model relying on class-wide 
data.13  Although allocating the damages among class members 
 
13 To calculate aggregate damages, Dr. Lamb relied on 
Reckitt’s sales data and explained that he could allocate 
individualized damages based on this same data.   Accordingly, 
even individualized damages assessments would require 
common evidence.  Moreover, in this case, the class includes 
seventy-two direct purchasers seeking only to recover the 
money spent to buy name-brand Suboxone products that would 
not have been spent had generic competition existed, and not 
lost profits.  Reckitt has produced their sales information.  
From this common evidence, the Purchasers proposed a trial 
plan for the pro rata allocation of Purchasers’ damages.  See In 
re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521-WHO, 2017 
WL 679367, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017) (approving 
aggregate damages model using pro rata formula); see also 
Lamictal, 957 F.3d at 194-95 (observing that “damages need 
not be ‘susceptible of measurement across the entire class for 
16 
 
may be necessary after judgment, “such individual questions 
do not ordinarily preclude the use of the class action device.”  





 Finally, Reckitt argues that Burlington is not an 
adequate class representative.  Rule 23(a)(4) requires a district 
court to find that “representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(4).  “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to 
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the 
class they seek to represent.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players Concussion Injury Litig. (NFL), 821 F.3d 410, 431 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625 (1997)).  For a class representative to be adequate, it 
must have “[a] minimal degree of knowledge” about the case, 
id. at 430 (quoting New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of 
Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007)), and have no 
conflict of interest with class counsel, e.g., Larson v. AT&T 
Mobility LLC, 687 F.3d 109, 132 (3d Cir. 2012), and members 
of the class, Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 
F.3d 170, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2012).14  Only “fundamental” 
 
purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)’” (quoting Modafinil, 837 F.3d at 
260)). 
14 Reckitt does not dispute that Burlington has a 
minimal degree of knowledge of the litigation.   
17 
 
conflicts “will defeat the adequacy requirement.”  Dewey, 681 
F.3d at 184.  
 
 Reckitt argues that the Purchasers failed to satisfy the 
adequacy requirement because Burlington has a risk of a 
conflict with class counsel and lacks control over the litigation, 
precluding it from protecting the class.  Both arguments fail.  
First, each conflict that Reckitt identifies is speculative or 
without basis.  Reckitt suggests that class counsel and the class 
representative could have conflicting views on (1) what 
allegations should be made, (2) who should be named as a 
defendant, (3) whether to accept a settlement, (4) whether to 
go to trial, and (5) whether litigation decisions will have effects 
on other cases.  Such hypothetical conflicts cannot defeat 
adequacy.  Id. (“A conflict that is unduly speculative, however, 
is generally not fundamental.”); see also id. (noting that the 
adequacy requirement can be satisfied when “[a]t this stage in 
the litigation, the existence of such conflicts is hypothetical” 
(quoting Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 
680 (7th Cir. 2009))).15 
 
 
15 Further, Reckitt’s hypothetical conflicts would apply 
to most class actions.  For example, Reckitt suggests as one 
conflict that class representatives may seek to add defendants 
to increase potential recovery, while class counsel might avoid 
adding defendants due to “the cost of complicating the case” 
and “extending the timetable before resolution.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 50.  Such a conflict is possible in many class actions.  
Ironically, however, this conflict is not even at risk in this case 
because the Purchasers’ allegations and facts focus exclusively 
on Reckitt, and there is no other defendant to add.    
18 
 
Second, Reckitt’s claim that Burlington has ceded 
control of this litigation to class counsel, and that this creates a 
risk of conflicts, does not render Burlington an inadequate 
representative.  Reckitt cites no precedent from this Court for 
its argument that a class representative must “control” the 
litigation.  Indeed, we have observed that “it is counsel for the 
class representative and not the named parties . . . who direct 
and manage [class] actions.  Every experienced federal judge 
knows that any statements to the contrary [are] sheer 
sophistry.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 292 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting 
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1973)).  Moreover, Burlington is not a disengaged 
representative.  The record shows that Burlington is aware of 
its role as a fiduciary, understands the basis for the claimed 
injury, has an incentive to recover its proportionate share of 
damages, monitors the litigation, produced documents, and has 
the requisite interest in and knowledge about the case to satisfy 
the adequacy requirement.  NFL, 821 F.3d at 430; In re Gen. 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 
Accordingly, Reckitt’s attack on Burlington’s adequacy 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order certifying a direct purchaser class. 
